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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee

)

Case No. 20050553

Vs.
Tamara Rhinehart,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2)(c) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. This appeal is taken under Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution, Sections 77-1-6(g) and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The Court should review the trial court's decision to deny the Defendant's
Motion to Quash Bindover from the preliminary hearing for allowing
unreliable hearsay statements to be introduced against Defendant at the
preliminary hearing as part of the State's case in chief The Standard of
Review is the determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for
trial is a question of law. State v Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (2001)

The trial court erred in allowing the State to prosecute the burglary and theft
cases prior to the homicide case. The Standard of Review is Unfairly
Prejudicial. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403.

The Court should review for correctness the district court's legal conclusion
that the challenged statements were admissible under exemptions to the
hearsay rule. See State v Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The
admissibility of evidence under the hearsay exceptions requires the
application of facts to the legal requirements of the rule and that the trial
court has some discretion in making this determination. See N.D. v A.EL
2004 UT App 215, 11,73 P.3d 971.
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IV.

The Court should review the trial court's decision to deny the Defendant's
motion for a new trial. The Standard of review is Abuse of Discretion. State v
Torres-Garcia. 2006 UT App 48.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The defendant was originally charged with capital murder in the First District Court
in Cache County, State of Utah. The defendant was also charged with a related second
case on charges including burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a second degree
felony. The Defendant had a jury trial where she was found guilty on both counts. The
second case consisting of the burglary and theft charges are on appeal here.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

This case (State court case number 031101017) is related to the capital
murder proceeding (State court case number 031100633). The two cases
were consolidated for the purpose of the preliminary hearing
proceedings.

2.

The case was prosecuted in the First District Court in Cache County,
State of Utah. The case was heard in a preliminary hearing in the trial

3

court over multiple days in February, 2004. The trial court bound the
matter over for trial. (R.87-93) (T. P.H. Vol 3 p 61)
3.

Defendant moved to quash bindover. (R.31 -48)

4.

The trial court orally denied Defendant's motion to quash the bindover
at a hearing held May 10, 2004. The trial court entered a written
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
BINDOVER on June 3, 2004. (R.73-74)

5.

The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. (R.52728)

6.

Hearsay statements were allowed in the trial. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 22-28)

7.

The Defendant's objections to the hearsay statements were overruled.
(T. Trial Vol 2 pp 22-28)

8.

The Defendant was found guilty at the conclusion of the trial on January
13,2005. (T. Trial Vol 3 pp 65-66)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The hearsay evidence admitted at preliminary hearing was a violation of Defendant
Tamara Rhinehart's constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine.
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The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. There was
newly discovered evidence that was significant to the trial and potentially outcome
determinative in the matter.
The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motions regarding the order of her
trials. The order of the trials was unfairly prejudicial towards the Defendant.
The trial court erred in overruling the Defendant's objections to hearsay statements
made during the trial.

ARGUMENT

At the preliminary hearing the State relied entirely on hearsay to support
the charges in the present case:

Craig Nicholls:
Mr. Nicholls is the charged co-defendant in the aggravated murder case
against defendant. He was charged as the principle actor and the actual assassin in
relation to the aggravated murder. He is also alleged to be an accomplice in the
present case, though he has never been charged. The Statement was taken
subsequent to Mr. Nicholls entering a plea or guilty pursuant to a plea bargain that
spared him the death penalty. (R.249-261)
On November 12, 2003 Mr. Nicholls participated in an interview with
police about the murder to which he had pleaded guilty. He also discussed the
alleged burglary. The statement was recorded by a registered professional reporter,
5

though no attorney was present and no opportunity for cross-examination was
provided. The interview transcript (hereafter "Nicholls Interview") was offered as
State's Exhibit 26 at the preliminary hearing, and was admitted over defendant's
numerous objections. The Nicholls Interview is 87 pages long. (R. 272-357)
The trial court found Mr. Nicholls to be unavailable to testify at the
preliminary hearing by way of his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.
Mamie Christianson:
The trial court admitted, over Defendant's objection, a partial transcript
of a telephone interview of Mamie Christianson, by police, marked as State's
Exhibit 29 (hereafter "Christiansen interview excerpt.") No claim is made that Ms.
Christiansen was an actual witness to any burglary or any actions of the defendant.
The Christianson interview excerpt simply makes statements of Ms. Christianson as
to what admissions Rhinehart allegedly stated to her about being involved in the
burglary. (R. 484-499) A summary of her testimony during trial is as follows:
a. That she was the hairdresser/manicurist for the Defendant for a
substantial period of time prior to the summer of 2003;
b. That in the summer of 2003, Tamara Rhinehart made numerous
statements to Ms. Christensen while Ms. Rhinehart was a client in
Ms. Christensen's salon, to the effect that Tamara Rhinehart had
stolen a safe from someone, in conjunction with her boyfriend, that
UAJ.V/ p v W U U l V
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heist depicted in the film, "The Italian Job/' and that Ms. Rhinehart
had received some cash money and/or some jewelry from the theft of
the safe. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 42-54)
The government supplied discovery to the defense in this case in advance of the
trial. As part of that discovery, the defense was supplied with a transcript of an interview
between law enforcement officers and Mamie Christensen, in which she is first reporting
to law enforcement her concerns about the Defendant herein, including reports about the
theft of a safe and Tamara Rhinehart's alleged admissions about the same. The tape and
the transcript of that recording simply stop. There is no summary, conclusion or
"wrapping up" of the conversation by the officer and there is no official statement that
the conversation is ending. It appears that the conversation may have ended without
anyone making note of the fact, or that the tape ran out accidentally, or that the tape was
deliberately shut off in the middle of the conversation. It is impossible to tell which from
the tape itself.
Toward the end of the conversation which defense did receive, the officers are
requesting that Marnie Christensen wear a wire sound transmission device, and that she
set up a conversation or conversations with Tamara Rhinehart, with police officers
listening in on those conversations. By the point in time when the tape supplied in
discovery stops, Mamie Christensen is resisting the officer's idea of wearing a wire and
of speaking to the defendant.
Counsel for the Defendant, prior to the burglary trial in question, specifically
inquired of the prosecution whether or not Mamie Christensen had "worn a wire" and
7

spoken to the Defendant while being monitored by law enforcement. Eventually, counsel
for the defense conveyed to the prosecution in correspondence their assumption that,
since there was no recording of any such intercepted conversations, nor any police reports
to the effect that such monitored conversations had occurred, no such conversations had
taken place. The prosecution did not respond at all, one way or the other, to this letter
from the Defense regarding their discovery assumptions in this case. Accordingly,
Defendant went to trial in this matter based upon what had not been provided in
discovery and based upon this correspondence to the prosecution confirming that Marnie
Christensen had never "worn a wire," while speaking to the Defendant and that police
had never monitored such conversation(s).
Sue Davis:
A hand-written statement of Sue Davis was admitted over Defendant's
objection. (State Exhibit 26, P.H.) The statement relates that she went to dinner with
Rhinehart, that she has subsequently been told that she was burglarized during the
dinner, that Rhinehart was a party to the burglary, and what she believes was taken.
(Preliminary hearing evidence from the responding police officers indicated that Ms.
Davis was not aware, before being told by her sister, that she may have been the
victim of burglary. She believed that she must have simply misplaced the items.)
(T. Trial Vol 1 pp 112-114,121,125-126,133-136)
The State relied entirely and solely on the above testimonial hearsay to
support its case at the preliminary hearing. The bindover order was therefore based
only on non-confronted hearsay.
8

A. The Right to Confront
Rhinehart was denied her constitutional right to confront and cross examine the
hearsay declarants at preliminary hearing pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1 Sections 12 and 13 of the Utah
Constitution, and due process rights both state and federal in origin. On March 8, 2004
the United States Supreme Court, in Crawford v Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, reaffirmed
that the right of confrontation is plenary and allows for no exceptions where testimonial
hearsay is implicated.
In Crawford, a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court, stating that the
ruling was "largely consistent with" precedent and "remaining faithful to the Framer's
understanding/' held unequivocally that:
Where testimonial evidence is at issue.. .the Sixth Amendmenl demands what the
common law required: unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination.

Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient
to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation.

Id. at 1374. In reaching the holding, the Court reviewed the full history of the
confrontation right, determining that its significance cannot be understated. The Court
reiterated that the particular value inherent in confrontation lies within its unique power
to test the credibility and reliability of testimony. Thus, rules of evidence or other
legislative or judicially-created doctrines developed to assess "reliability" and which may
allow for the admission of testimonial hearsay, are superceded by the United States
9

Constitution and are nullity where testimonial hearsay is sought to be introduced against
a criminal defendant:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to
leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence,
much less to amorphous notions of "reliability.".... Admitting statements deemed
reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be
sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination.
Id. at 1370. In fact, the Court held that, where a court finds reliability based upon factors
such as the fact that a statement is made to police against penal interest, or that it was
given under oath at a judicial proceeding, insult is added to injury, since uthe single
safeguard missing is the one the Confrontation Clause demands." Id. at 1372.
The absolute right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing
has long been recognized in Utah. The most exhaustive examination of the right is found
in State v Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). There, the State sought to proceed at a
preliminary examination partly by way of an affidavit containing testimonial hearsay,
citing to then-existing U.C.A. 77-15-19. The Utah Supreme Court held that a preliminary
hearing is a critical stage in the criminal process, and requires the application of
substantive and procedural constitutional rights, including especially the rights afforded
under the Confrontation Clause.
Our review of the nature and purpose of the preliminary examination illustrates the
critical character of the proceeding in relation to various substantive rights of the
defendant which are subject to infringement by the exclusion of certain procedural
safeguards at this step in the criminal prosecution. Recognizing the "critical"
character of this proceeding the Supreme Court has extended the right of counsel (as
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution) to [the preliminary
hearing]... .The protections afforded by the right of confrontation at the preliminary
10

examination are equally important and so inter-related to the right of effective
counsel and the presentation of a defense that they must be guaranteed the accused
at the preliminary hearing.

Id at 784-85, citing Coleman v Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969), United States v Wade. 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and other federal cases which have been omitted.
In so ruling, the Court in Anderson relied on historical and procedural
considerations that mirror those expressed in Crawford. The holding in Anderson is
founded on both State and Federal Constitutional principles. The fimdamental importance
of the right of confrontation was tied inherently to other inimitable rights such as the right
to counsel, the right to discovery, and ultimately the right to due process and a fair trial.
If the preliminary hearing is to retain any meaningful significance in the criminal
prosecution and provide an effective means of weeding out improvident
prosecutions, the protections attendant the defendant's right to present an
affirmative defense cannot be circumvented by allowing the prosecution to base its
showing of probable cause on hearsay evidence.. ..The recognition of the right of
confrontation at the preliminary examination merely demands the prosecution's use
of hearsay evidence at the hearing may not circumvent the defendant's substantive
rights to a fair trial, by denying the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who offer testimony at the hearing.
Id. at 786 (citations omitted.)
In 1995 Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution was amended, adding
language about the use of so-called "reliable hearsay" at preliminary examinations. In
relation to the amendment, Rule 1102 was added to the Utah Rules of Evidence,
purporting to allow "reliable hearsay" at the preliminary examination, and providing
specific examples of what such hearsay might include. According to the Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 1102, there was an intent in its passage of abrogating Anderson
to the extent that its holding was inconsistent wit the new Rule. However, since Anderson
11

is based upon federal constitutional principles, which principles have primacy over any
rule to be to the contrary, Anderson remains the law. To the extent that anything in the
1995 amendment to Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution or Rule 1102 is
inconsistent with Crawford, it is unconstitutional. Moreover, nothing in the Advisory
Committee Note specifically related to the confrontation right holding in Anderson.
Instead, the Note can be read as applying only to notion of "reliable hearsay," and stating
that anything in Anderson that is inconsistent with those notions are abrogated, keeping
intact Anderson's holding that confrontation rights apply at preliminary hearings. The
reading of the Note and the purpose behind Rule 1102 is the most apt. It allows for an
interpretation of the Rule that is constitutionally consistent with the Anderson conclusion
that confrontation rights exist at preliminary hearings, and makes sense of the policy and
purpose of Rule 1102: to expand the list of the kinds of "reliable hearsay" for admission
at the preliminary hearing. In other words, the amendment to Article 1, Section 2 and
Rule 1102 did nothing to undermine the legal fact that confrontation rights apply at
preliminary hearings; it simply expanded, for the purpose of preliminary hearings only,
the already existent, rule-created hearsay exceptions.
The federal constitutional underpinnings of Anderson are also likely responsible for
the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has maintained fidelity to the "critical stage"
holding therein. This court declined the invitation of various amicus parties in State v
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1228 (1995) to overrule Anderson.

12

Should this Court disagree with defendant's argument that the holding in Crawford
applies to the preliminary hearing in the present matter, the reasoning and basis for the
holding should be considered to test the findings of "reliability" with regard to the
specific hearsay admitted in the present case. For instance, Nicholls is, as the State
acknowledges, an alleged accomplice in both the capital murder and the present charges.
Nicholls was charged and putatively became an informant witness in exchange for his
very life, perhaps the greatest incentive an informant can have to lie or to color his
statements in favor of the prosecution The statements of such persons have long been
considered to be inherently unreliable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Bruton v United
States. 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Lilly v. Virginia. 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Cruz v New York,
481 U.S. 186 (1987); Lee v Illinois. 476 U.S. 530 (1986). The Court in Lilly flatly held
that "a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant... [is a]
category of hearsay [that] encompasses statements that are inherently unreliable." 527
U.S. 116, 130-131. Further, the Court noted the longstanding nature of the legal principle:
"we have over the years 'spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable
accomplices' confession that incriminate defendants." Id., citing Lee, Cruz, and Bruton.
The Court in Crawford also specifically complained that state courts seemed to admit
such testimony despite the fact that the Confrontation Clause "plainly meant to exclude"
it. Crawford at 1371-72, citing many state court decisions. The Court commented that,
[t]o add insult to injury, some of the courts that admit untested testimonial statements
find reliability in the very factors that make the statements testimonial, ..." such as
statements made under oath. Id. at 1372.
13

The very same factors were relied upon at the preliminary hearing below to admit
the testimonial hearsay complained of. Crawford makes clear that, even if a reliability
review were allowable, which it is not, the statements involved here are quintessentially
unreliable. Admitting them into evidence violated defendant's federal and state due
process rights, in addition to the infringement on her federal Sixth Amendment rights.
Rule 1102 is not and cannot, under any constitutional interpretation, be read as a list
of sufficient conditions indicative of reliability hearsay for the purposes of preliminary
hearings. It cannot be that all that need be shown is that any one of the listed categories
be applicable to the statement. Instead, the Rule can at most be read as a list of factors
that, if a hearsay is otherwise not reliable, are necessary conditions to its admissibility at
preliminary hearings. The statements at issue in the present case are quintessentially
unreliable hearsay, and cannot be made reliable simply by the formalistic and categorical
application of Rule 1102.
(It is also worth noting that the passage of the amendment to Article 1, Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution and the creation of Rule 1102 was solely in relation to the requests
of victim rights advocates and in response to a stated desire to avoid "victims'5 having to
testify needlessly. None of the declarants in the present case—especially the assassin and
his accomplice—could remotely be characterized as "victims," in any sense.)
C. Newly Discovered Evidence.
A key witness in the prosecution of Defendant during the jury trial was Ms. Marnie
Christensen. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 42-55) Ms. Christensen's testimony against Ms. Rhinehart
v/as the most significant testimony in support of conviction, for reason that Ms.
14

Christensen was the only person who could connect Ms. Rhinehart in any way with the
crime in issue. No other physical evidence nor testimonial evidence in this case connects
this defendant with this particular crime. In other words, but for the testimony of Ms.
Christensen and but for the finding of the credibility of that testimony, neither conviction
against Ms. Rhinehart on either count could be sustained.
Further, the testimony of Ms. Christensen was the most critical testimony at trial to
establish that a crime had even occurred. Absent the testimony of Ms. Christensen to the
effect that Tamara Rhinehart had admitted being an accomplice to the burglary and an
accomplice to the theft of the safe, there would not be sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that a theft or burglary of the safe had ever occurred. (T. Trial
Vol 2 pp 42-55) The victim of the crimes of conviction (Sue Davis) did not report a theft
or loss of the safe until after the police contacted her with information from Ms.
Christensen. Ms. Davis and members of her family believed the victim might simply
have lost or misplaced the safe until hearing of the admission of Ms. Rhinehart to Marnie
Christensen. In other words, absent the testimony of Ms. Christensen, and reliance on the
credibility thereof, the State could not prove by necessary burden of proof even that a
crime had been committed.
It must be presumed that the lack of discovery regarding conversations which took
place after Ms. Christensen supposedly agreed to the wire, and did wear the wire were
not inculpatory as to Defendant, or, most certainly, reports of those conversations from
law enforcement officers and recordings of those conversations would have been adduced
at uiai. D i a u y v Mctiyictlia, J /J U.d. OJ (l^OJJ
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The evidence against the Defendant herein is highly circumstantial. In cases such as
this, the very absence of inculpatory statements, taken under these circumstances, is
exculpatory as to the Defendant, and as to her criminal case herein.
D. The Order of Trials
The Defendant strenuously objected, on a number of occasions, as to the order of
trials between this case and the Defendant's capital murder case (Court Case Number
031100633). (R.358-362). The trial court's decision that the order of trials herein was in
the sole discretion of the prosecution, and that the prosecution could proceed to trial first
in this burglary case constituted a substantial error and was prejudicial to the Defendant
in terms of her ability to defend herself in this burglary action.
Due to the order of trial in this case, and due to the pendency of the capital murder
in which the government was seeking the death of Tamara Rhinehart, Ms. Rhinehart was
precluded in cross-examination from probing the most fundamental factors of the
circumstantial evidence in this case. She was compressed between the need to defend
herself on the burglary charge on the one hand, and the need to avoid making a statement
relevant to the death penalty in the murder case on the other hand.
The fears of being cross-examined regarding circumstances and individuals closely
related to the murder case precluded the defendant from taking the witness stand to
defend herself in the burglary case. As a result, the jury was given, and could only be
given, a tortured and incomplete explanation of how the investigation of the murder case
let to the investigation of the burglary case. The question from the jury during
deliberation regarding the circumstances surrounding the investigation, due to the proper
16

pre-trial ruling of the court limiting discussion of the murder investigation, could not
appropriately be probed in the course of trial nor clarified for the jury. (R. 422-423) Rule
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly states, "Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it
has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means.. .or otherwise
causes the jury to base its decision on something other than the facts of the case." In State
vJDeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court found that although evidence may
have probative value, the overwhelming probability of unfair prejudice and confusion of
the issues submitted to the jury clearly affected the substantial rights of the defendant.
(R.422-423)
Most importantly, because of the Defendant's inability to discuss with critical
witnesses Marnie Christensen, Craig Nicholls, and Jessica Goalan their personal
involvement in the murder case, and/or their involvement in the investigation of the
murder case, the Defendant was effectively denied her rights to confront and crossexamine these witnesses as to facts crucial to the burglary defense. Therefore, during the
trial, the Defendant was denied the same Constitutional rights of confront and crossexamine that she was denied during the pretrial. The same argument and cases outlined
above apply here as well.
The order of the trials in this case was unfairly prejudicial to the Defendant because
the jury was unable to focus on the facts of the case because Ms. Rhinehart was unable to
fully cross-examine witness, nor testify on her behalf because of her fear of incriminating
herself in the pending murder case.
D. Hearsay Statements Made During the Trial
17

We have outlined above how the hearsay evidence introduced during the
preliminary hearing denied the Defendant of her constitutional rights. Despite objections
from the defense, the trial court allowed hearsay to be introduced during the trial as well.
The issue at hand is whether the defense "opened the door" by questioning Detective
Bennett on the subject of whether he had verified the existence of the safe. The Defense
asked, "You didn't ask her whether there was anyone else who had any knowledge of
whether a safe ever existed?" Detective Bennett answered, "Not to my knowledge." (T.
Trial Vol 2 p 17). During redirect examination, the State took liberties to elicit hearsay
statements that were made by other individuals on the argument that the "door had been
opened." It is the Defense's stance that the line of questioning was in the context of
talking or not talking with family members of the alleged victim, not to include the
hearsay statements made by others. The State and court disagreed and ruled that the door
had been opened sufficiently. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 26-27)
Allowing the hearsay into the trial was very prejudicial towards the Defendant. The
alleged victim never reported a lost safe to the police or members of her family. It was
only after the police came to her and asked her if she was missing a safe did she make
any comment about even owning a safe. (T. Trial Vol 1 pp 112-114, 121, 125-126) Even
after questioning, the alleged victim and her family said she probably had just misplaced
the safe. (T. Trial Vol 1 pp 133-136) The only collaboration that there ever was a safe
comesfromhearsay statements made by Craig Nicholls in an interview which took place
before the preliminary hearing. These statements were never cross-examined by the
Defense, as they were denied this right in the preliminary7 hearing. Furthermore, Mr.
18

Nicholls was a hostile witness during the trial and flat out denied any knowledge of a
burglary. The State never asked him about the existence of the safe during the trial, the
alleged safe has never been recovered, and as far as we know, it never existed. The
Defense's objection to the hearsay statements allowed into the trial is on record. (T. Trial
Vol 2 pp 26-28)
Without the hearsay statements, there would be no evidence of any burglary, and as
a result no burglary case. Rhinehart was denied her constitutional right to confront and
cross examine the hearsay declarants pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, Article 1 Sections 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution,
and due process rights both state and federal in origin. On March 8, 2004 the United
States Supreme Court, in Crawford v Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354. reaffirmed that the
right of confrontation is plenary and allows for no exceptions where testimonial hearsay
is implicated. The hearsay statements should never have been allowed into the trial
The trial court obviously erred in their decision to allow the hearsay evidence under
the weak argument that the Defense had "opened the door." Even if the Defense had
"opened the door" as the State claims, Ihey didn't open the door for the Detective to
testify about hearsay statements. If the door was opened, witnesses should have been
called to testify to the existence of the safe, with the opportunity of cross-examination to
test their reliability. Instead, we have testimony consisting of hearsay statements, which
the Detective claims were made to him at an earlier time. Without the crucible of cross
examination, there is no way to test the reliability of the hearsay statements. Mr. Nicholls,
a prisoner with a pending murder case with the State seeking the death penalty, is the
19

primary witness to the existence of a safe. If anyone had motive to lie, especially in the
light that the death penalty would be removed in exchange for their testimony, it would
be Mr. Nicholls. Without the opportunity for cross-examination, and with the witness
denying any knowledge of a burglary in their testimony during the trial, the reliability of
these hearsay statements is surely in question. As we outlined in our previous arguments,
the Defense must be given the opportunity for confrontation and cross examination for
the very purpose of testing the reliability these statements. In Crawford, the Court
reiterated that the particular value inherent in confrontation lies within its unique power
to test the credibility and reliability of testimony. The trial court denied Ms Rhinehart her
most basic, fundamental rights by allowing the introduction of the hearsay statements
without the opportunity for confrontation. The Defense's objections should have been
granted, and the hearsay statement's should never have been allowed to come in during
the trial.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in their denial to grant the Defendant's motion to quash
bindover. The admission of the hearsay at the preliminary hearing in the present case was
unconstitutional. The defendant was denied her constitutional right to confront and crossexamine, and the hearsay in issue is unreliable.
The trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to take the burglary case to trial
before the capital murder case. The Defendant was denied her right to take the stand and
to confront and cross-examine key witnesses because of the pending murder case.
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The trial court erred in their denial to grant the Defendant's motion for a new trial.
The admission of the hearsay statements, the order of the trials, and the admission of new
evidence prejudiced the Defendant, and denied her of her rights to a fair trial.
Wherefore the Defendant requests that the Appellate Court reverse the trial court's
decision and:
A.

Grant the Defendant's motion to quash bindover.

B.

Grant the Defendant's motion for a new trial.

C.

Grant the Defendant's motion to have the capital murder case tried before the
burglary and theft case.

Furthermore, the Defense requests oral arguments in this case.

Dated this

i I

day of March, 2006

David M. Perry
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N. GEORGE DAINES, #0803
Cache County Attorney
11 West 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
(435)716-8361
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER

vs.

TAMARA RHINEHART,

Case Nos. 031100633
031101017
Judge: Gordon J. Low

Defendant.

The Court, after review and consideration of the Defendant's Motion to Quash, the
State's Response to the Defendant's Motion to Quash, and the oral argument presented to
the Court on May 10, 2004, now makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. On February 5, 6, 11, and 27, 2004, a preliminary hearing was conducted in the
above entitled matter.
2. On February 6, 2004, the State concluded its presentation of evidence. At the
request of the defense so they would have additional time to present additional witnesses,
the Court continued the hearing to February 11, 2004.

3. On February 11th, prior to the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the State
filed a Second Amended Information charging the defendant with one count of
aggravated murder, one count of forgery, and four counts of communications fraud. The
State requested the Court to bind the defendant over for trial on all six counts contained in
the Second Amended Information in case #031100633 (North Logan homicide) and on all
three counts in the Information in case #031101017 (the Providence burglary).
4. On February 11, 2004, the defendant presented her case, and at the conclusion
of the hearing, the Court bound the defendant over on the crime of criminal homicide,
aggravated murder, a capital offense, finding that the crime was committed and that the
defendant committed it. See Preliminary Hearing Transcript, vol. 3, p. 61. The Court
withheld ruling on the bind over of the remaining counts and requested the State prepare a
memorandum detailing what evidence had been presented during the preliminary hearing
that supported the remaining charges contained in the Amended Information filed in case
#031100633 and the Information filed in case #031101017. The Court provided time for
the defendant to respond to the State's memorandum and set a hearing for February 27,
2004, where the defendant could present any additional evidence or information to the
Court.
5. On February 13, 2004, the State filed its Post Preliminary Hearing
Memorandum detailing the evidence presented by the State that supported each of the
remaining counts which had not been bound over for trial. The defendant did not file a
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response to the State's memorandum nor did the defendant call any further witnesses at
the hearing held on February 27, 2004.
6. On February 27, 2004, the Court found that probable cause was established and
existed for each of the crimes charged in the remaining counts in both cases and that they
were committed by the defendant. The Court bound over the defendant on the charges in
both cases and required her to appear to answer to those charges before the district court.
See Preliminary Hearing Transcript for Feb. 27, p. 46.
7. On March 4, 2004, the defendant filed its Motion to Quash Bindover. On
March 24, 2004, the defendant filed its supporting memorandum. On April 7, 2004, the
State submitted its response to the defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover.
8. During the preliminary hearing, the State presented testimony from Chief Kim
Hawkes, Detective Shawn Bennett, and Detective Jim Williamson. Through these
witnesses, the State provided direct testimony of the investigation of the death of Michael
Brodrero. The evidence received and considered by the Court included: (1) Several
pictures of the murder scene; (2) The Medical Examiner's report of examination of
Michael Brodrero stating that the he died of gunshot wounds inflicted by another
individual; (3) Applications for life insurance policies, made by the defendant via the
internet, taken out in the name of the victim and listing the defendant as a beneficiary; (4)
An application for life insurance on the victim submitted by the defendant to Shawn
Iverson; (5) Voluntary statement of Shawn Iverson indicating that the defendant
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submitted an application for life insurance on the victim; (6) Direct testimony that the
signature on the application submitted by the defendant to Shawn Iverson was a forgery
and there being a high probability that the signature was forged by the defendant; (7)
Statement of Mamie Christianson, the defendant's hair dresser, made to the North Park
Police Department, wherein Ms. Christianson gave an account of the admissions made by
the defendant to her of the defendant's plans to kill Michael Boudrero and of her
commission of a burglary of a safe containing money and jewelry; (8) Sworn witness
statement of Sue Davis detailing that a safe was taken from her home in Providence,
Utah, that contained $6,500 in cash and miscellaneous jewelry items; (9) Business records
of Globe indicating communications from the defendant, wherein she requested actions
with respect to life insurance policies on Michael Boudrero, including a time where, with
the assistance of the defendant, Mr. Nicholls posed as Michael Boudrero and attempted
to reinstate a policy that Mr. Boudrero had previously cancelled; and (10) Nicholls' Rule
11 Statement, Nicholls'Intereview,

and Goalen Interview which each describe in similar

and extensive details the defendant's participation in acquiring insurance policies on
Michael Boudrero, of planning a ruse to lure Mr. Boudrero out to a job site in North
Logan where he would be killed by Nicholls, and of disposing of the evidence after the
murder was completed.
9. During the course of the Preliminary Hearing, the State offered and the Court
received thirty-three exhibits. The defendant only objected to the admission of six of
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these exhibits including: State's Exhibit #25 (Nicholls Interview); States Exhibit #24
(Goalen Interview); State's Exhibit #23 (Nicholls Rule 11 Waiver/Statement); State's
Exhibit 29 (Transcript of Mamie Chnstensen); State's Exhibit 31 (Globe Message
Display) and State's Exhibit #33 (Globe Life Letter and Message Display). The rest of the
remaining twenty-seven State's exhibits were offered and received by the Court without
objection from the defendant.
10. On August 14, 2003, Ms. Goalen was interviewed and admonished by
Detective Jacobson to tell the truth and she was further placed under oath by Kelly L.
Wilburn, a Registered Professional Reporter and the interview was transcribed verbatim.
11. On November 10, 2003, Craig Nicholls pleaded guilty to Aggravated Murder,
a capital felony and signed a document entitled "Notice of Plea Bargain Rule 11
Waiver/Statement of Facts." With the assistance of Mr. Nicholls, this document was
prepared by Mr. Nicholls' attorneys and the State. During the change of plea hearing, Mr.
Nicholls was placed under oath and was read the document and confirmed each statement
of fact contained in the document as being true and accurate. The Court accepted Mr.
Nicholls 7 plea finding that it was freely, knowingly and voluntarily made.
12. On November 12, 2003, Craig Nicholls met with Detectives Bennett and
Jacobson at the Logan City Police Department for an interview. Before the interview
began, Detective Jacobson admonished Mr. Nicholls that he needed to be truthful and that
if he wasn't, additional charges could be brought against him. Prior to the interview,
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Rodney M. Felshaw, a Registered Professional Reporter, swore in Mr. Nicholls.
13. The Court received State's Exhibits ##23, 24, and 25 finding they were reliable
and admissible pursuant to Rule 1102 (b)(8)(a) and (b)(9) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
This Court finds that Nicholls' Rule 11 Statement was detailed, clear, under oath, and in
exchange for a lesser penalty. Nicholls' Interview corroborates Nicholls' Rule 11
Statement on most points, but in more detail, and is likewise under oath. This interview,
which gives some additional detail to Nicholls' Rule 11 Statement, was also given after
the sentencing and not before, so there was no consideration relative to whether or not it
was in expectation of a lesser penalty. The detail found in Nicholls' Statement and
Nicholls' Interview is remarkably consistent with the other evidence presented at the
Preliminary Hearing and enhances its reliability.
14. The Goalen Statement was received and corroborated with minute details
which would only be known by someone with a relationship, which raises its reliability.
It was likewise under oath and not in exchange for any immunity. It was corroborated by
the Nicholls' Interview and Nicholls' Ride 11 Statement. It had internal and external
corroboration, as well as the interview suggested by Detective Jacobson. State's Exhibit
#1, Shaun Iverson 's Statement likewise has internal and external corroboration, as does
the State fs Exhibit #26, Sue Davis' Statement. The reliability of both of those have been
established consistent with Rule 1102 and independent of that and also with respect to the
testimony of Detective Bennett and Williamson. All of the testimony from the witnesses
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demonstrated a reliability and corroboration of the other hearsay statements received
consistent with Rule 1102.
16. On July 16, 2003, Marnie Christianson called the North Park Police
Department and talked with Officer John Italasano. During this conversation she
disclosed information regarding the defendant's involvement in the murder of Michael
Boudrero. This tape recorded conversation was copied and forwarded to the defense on
August 28, 2003. On February 5, 2004, Ms. Christianson signed an affidavit and affirmed
that the contents of the transcript were an accurate account of the conversation she had
with Officer Italasano. During the preliminary hearing, a partial transcript of this call was
offered and received by the Court into evidence. Ms. Christianson had been subpoenaed
to the preliminary hearing by the defendant and available to be cross examined on her
statement during the proceedings. The defendant objected to the admission of the
transcript, but never called Ms. Christianson to testify at the preliminary hearing.
17. The defendant's objection to State's Exhibits #37 and #33 was based upon the
theory that they would not be able to cross examine the caller that identified himself in the
business record as Michael Boudrero. The defendant's objection was denied and the
exhibits were admitted as business records.
18. In addition to its prior determination of probable cause in both case
#031100633 and case #031101017 finding that the crimes as charged were committed and
that the defendant committed them, the Court additionally finds that the evidence, were it
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segregated to exclude the following contested evidence: Nicholls Interview,

State's

Exhibit #25; Goalen Interview, State's Exhibit #25; and Nicholls Rule JI
Waiver/Statement, State 's Exhibit #23, the evidence is still sufficient to establish probable
cause that the crimes were committed in both case #031100633 and case #031101017 as
charged and that the defendant committed them.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Court hereby makes the following conclusions of law:
1. The hearsay evidence, presented during the preliminary hearing held in the
above entitled matter, was properly admitted pursuant to Article 1 section 12 of the Utah
Constitution and Rule 1102 of the Utah Rule of Evidence.
2. The hearsay evidence submitted by the State in each instance qualified under
Rule 1102(b)(8), (9) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as it was either a written, recorded, or
transcribed statement, given under oath or affirmation; or was given pursuant to a
notification to the declarant that a false statement made therein is punishable; or the
statement had other indica of reliability.
3. The same right to confront and cross examine a witness that is provided for in a
criminal trial does not exist in a preliminary hearing. The case of Craford v. Washington,
2004 WL 413301 applies to trial proceedings and does extend the same rights of
confrontation and cross examination to a preliminary hearing.
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4. The doctrine of merger is inapplicable to both case #031100633 and case
#031101017. Merger does not eliminate either of the aggravating factors found in Section
76-5-202 (f) & (g)of the Utah Code, nor does it eliminate any of the charges in either
case, as the statutory elements of any given charge is different than the elements required
to prove any of the remaining charges.
5. The defendant has failed to support with any law its argument that Section 76-5202(f) of the Utah Code is unconstitutional. This Court finds Section 76-5-202(f) to be
constitutional as it gives adequate notice to enable ordinary people to understand what
conduct is prohibited. This Court further concludes that Section 76- 5~202(f), (g) does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Accordingly,
It is ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover is denied in
whole.

„
Dated this _J_

y

day of j j y ^ ^ , 2004

Gordon
District Court Judge
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Volume

each side exercising four peremptories.

1 - rdyc u

Once that panel of

eight is seated, we will then call six more potential

jurors

3| and from them select two alternate jurors, giving each side
4| two peremptories.
MR. WYATT:
6I
7

Yes.

MS. CORPORON:

Yes, Your Honor.

I assume we won't

let the prospective jurors go until we've seated the ten?

8
9

So stipulated?

THE COURT:

Absolutely.

Everybody will stay in the

courtroom until we've seated a full ten jurors.

Throughout

10I the proceedings the alternates will recognize that they're in
11

an alternate position.

12

they may well be called upon to serve as jurors and should

13

pay the same attention to the proceedings as the regular

14

jurors.

15

entire case, after closing arguments, the alternates will be

16

released unless they've been asked to serve as a member of

17

the final panel.

18

I will remind them, however, that

But at the conclusion of the presentation of the

There are two motions pending before the court filed by

19

the defense.

One is a motion, and I want to get the exact

20

style of it.

An objection to order of trials.

21

received a moment ago Ms. Corporon's original reply, which I

22

understand was faxed to the court yesterday but I did not

23

have an opportunity to see it.

24

morning.

I just

I've just reviewed it this

This motion in various forms has been argued a

25} number of times in prior proceedings and we addressed it just
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1

briefly in chambers before coming into open court today.

21

The court is prepared to deny the motion,

finding

3

specifically that the state has the right to proceed in the

4

fashion and order which it has chosen to proceed.

5

the concerns raised by the defense, though not

6

inconsiderable, nevertheless the state has the right to

7

proceed.

8

mind an artificiality at the request of the defense

9

upon the prosecution.

10

And that

And doing otherwise would create in this court's
imposed

The second motion is a motion in limine relative to

11

certain evidence that may be approached in this case,

12

specifically relative to two witnesses, the testimony of Mr.

13

Nicholls and Ms. Goalen, which is anticipated to be presented

14

by the state.

lb

made in opening statement or in examination by the state of

16

these two witnesses relative to the charges against the

17

defendant of capital murder, which that trial is pending in

18

April.

19

The defense has asked that no reference be

The state has acquiesced in that response,

suggesting

20

that that's appropriate.

21

either cross-examination or case presentation that that door

22

may well be opened.

23

would have the right to address the issues.

I think both

24

parties, at least to a limited degree, would

acknowledge

25 j that.

But they anticipate that through

Should it be opened, then the state

The question is to what extent?
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1

Q.

Didn't ask further about the safe?

2

A.

Not at that time, no.

3

Q.

You didn't ask when she'd bought it?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

You didn't ask at that time about who had been around the

6

house in the months preceding that?

7 1 A.

Where she got it?

We did ask if there was anyone that she may have

8

suspected that could have committed a crime like this or

9

steal money from her safe.

10

Q.

Let me ask you to respond to my question.

You didn't ask

11

her whether or not there had been other people who had access

12

to the house?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

You didn't ask her who might have keys to the house?

lb

A.

We may have.

16

Q.

You don't recall, though?

17

A.

I don't recall.

18

Q.

It's not in the report anywhere that would help refresh

19

your recollection that you asked that, correct?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

You didn't ask her whether there was anyone else who had

22

any knowledge of whether a safe ever existed?

23\

A.

Not to my knowledge.

24

Q.

You never determined that there is another person on this

25

planet that1 ever saw a safe in the possession of Sue Davis,
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correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

You didn't know, I take it, because you didn't ask then,

4I that all of the work you heard about, that was testified
5

about yesterday, was done on that house in previous months?

6| A.
Q.

That's correct.
I take it, because you didn't ask and didn't know, that

other people had keys and had been taking care of pets and
9| things in that -apartment?
10

A.

That's correct.

11

Q.

Did you ask whether or not an. insurance claim had ever

12 I been made?
A.

We didn't.

14 1 Q.

To your knowledge none has?

15

To my knowledge none has.

A.

16

MR. WILLIAMS:
(BY MR. WILLIAMS)

Nothing further.

Well, I'm sorry.

17

Q.

There were some exhibits

18

that were admitted.

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

They have been marked as state's four, two and one.

They were photographs?

21J you familiar with those photographs?
A.

yesterday

I am.

23 1 Q.

Do you know who took them?

24

A.

I took them.

25

Q.

When did you take them?

Are
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A.

I took them last Friday.

Q.

hast Friday you took pictures for the firsr time of

tms

house?
A.

Yes.
MR. WILLIAMS::

Nothing further.

REDIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR, WYATT:
Q.

Detective, you were asked a question, and I didn't write

91 down the exact words of the question, but it was to the
10

effect did you verify with anybody that they had seen this

11

safe to prove the existence of the safe and your answer was

12

what?

13

A.

Could you rephrase that.

14

Q.

You were asked about whether or not you had verified with

15

anybody that they had seen this safe.

16

was that you had not?

17

A.

I had not.

18

Q.

Your answer to that question, does that relate to after

19

the report or at any time?

20

A.

At any time.

21

Q.

Had you ever talked to Marnie Christianson about that?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Jessica Goalen?

24

A.

Jessica Goalen was asked about the safe at a later time,

25

yes.

I believe your answer

Myself nor Detective Jacobson.

I've never spoken to Marnie Christianson.
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Q„

Craig Nicholls?

A,

Yes.

Craig Nicholls was asked about the safe a't a later

time .
4I Q.

Okay.

So who have you spoken to, then, that has verified

5| that the safe existed?
A.

1 need to make a correction.

Craig Nicholls was spoken

to at an earlier time concerning the safe.

But the only

8 I people that 1 spoke to concerning the safe would have been
9

Sue Davis and Geraldine Thomas.

10 J

12I

MR. WYATT:

May we approach for a moment?

THE COURT:

Yes.

(Sidebar, not reported.)

13

Q.

14

safe?

15 I A.
Q.
17I A.

(BY MR. WYATT)

Did you talk to Craig Nicholls about a

Yes, I did.
When did that happen?
I don't recall the exact date, but I can look through the

18

paperwork on my desk and tell you.

19

Q.

20 I A.
Q.

Who was present?
Myself, Detective Jacobson and our court reporter.
Did he tell you anything that would lead you to believe

whether or not Sue Davis had a safe?
23 I A.

Yes.

24

And what was that?

Q.

251 A.

Well, at the time he described the area that he had gone

Volume
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to to retrieve the safe.
Q.

And what did he describe?

A.

He described coming into the valley.
MR. WILLIAMS:

I would object on hearsay at this

point in time.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

7

Q.

(BY MR. WYATT)

8

A.

He described coming into the valley.

9

Sear's store which is located down by Macey's at the south

10

He described the

end of Logan.

11
12

Go ahead.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Objection.

Nonresponsive .

I think

he was asking about what he said about a safe.

13

THE COURT:

That's correct, Mr. Wyatt.

14

MR. WYATT:

I think he's answering that.

15

THE COURT:

I think the issue Mr. Williams raises on

1 6 hearsay restricts, because of the nature of the question and
17

what led to the question, the answer is relative to the safe,

18

not other perhaps unrelated matters.

19

MR. WYATT:

20

THE WITNESS:

I think he's describing where it was.
I can answer it differently.

21

Q.

(BY MR. WYATT)

22

A.

He described that he was to go into a home because there

23

was an aunt of Tamra Rhinehart who possessed a safe with some

24

money in that safe.

Go ahead.

That he would go into that home to take

that safe out while Tamra Rhinehart took the family members
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to lunch or dinner.
Q.

Did you talk to anybody else that told you about a safe?

A.

I talked to Jessica Goalen.

Q.

Ana did she say anything to you that caused you to

believe whether or not there was a safe in the possession of
Sue Davis?
A.

She did not know -MR. WILLIAMS:

9|

THE WITNESS:

10 |

THE COURT:

11 j hearsay.

Objection.

Hearsay.

-- who the safe belonged to.
Just a moment.

The answer may be

The problem is it wasn't responsive to your

12 | question.
13| Q.

(BY MR. WYATT)

let me ask the question again.

Did

14I Jessica Goalen tell you anything, yes or no?
15j A.

Yes.

161 Q.

That led you to believe whether or not Sue had a safe?

17 | A.

I'm not sure how to answer that.

Jessica knew of a safe,

18| but Jessica did not know who the safe belonged to,
9I Q.

Okay.

How did you draw any connection at all between

20

what Jessica told you?

21

A.

22

Christianson, Craig Nicholls and Sue Davis, Geraidine Thomas

23

and Jessica Goalen.

24

Q.

25

talked to you about a safe?

From collecting the conversations with Marnie

Anybody other than Jessica Goalen and Craig Nicholls that
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A.

Besides M a m i e Ctristianson, no.
MR. WYATT:

All right.

That's all that I have about

the safe.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. WILLIAMS:
Q.

Detective, let me clarify in case I confused anything.

Let me make sure I understand you correctly.

You went to

Gerry's house to talk to Gerry and Sue Davis with the belief
in your mind that you knew about a safe?
10 I A.

Correct.

11

Q.

You never had an opportunity, nor took any opportunity

12

before you went there on November 19th to Gerry's house, to

13 J otherwise verify that the safe had ever existed?
14 I A.

Prior to wnen?

15

When you talked to Gerry and Sue.

Q.

16 A.

Could you repeat that.

17 J Q.

You had in your mind that there was a safe and that came

from statements of other people as you have just testified
191 about?
20 A.

Correct.

21

Jessica Goalen?

Q.

22 I A.

Correct.

Q.

Who never told you she saw any safe?

A.

Correct.

25 I Q.

Marnie Christiansen?
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A.

Correct.

Q.

wno never told you she saw any safe?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And as you've said, Craig Nicholls?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Based on those statements, you went to Sue Davis and

Gerry's house to talk to them about what in your mind you
believed to be a crime that they were a victim of?
A.
10I Q.
11

Correct.
And you never have been able to verify with any person,

including Gerry Thomas, the existence of a safe?

12 I A.
Q.

Correct.
Nc family member has ever told you they had seen a safe?

14 j A.

Correct.

15

Q.

No people who had access to that apartment and live in

16

and about Sue Davis's life have ever confirmed to you that

1^

there was a safe?

16

A.

Correct.

19

MR. WILLIAMS:

20

THE C O U R T :

21 I

Nothing further.

Mr. Wyatt.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WYATT:
Q„

Did Craig Nicholls tell you about the safe prior to youi

24 1 visit with Sue Davis or after?
25

A.

It was prior to.
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Q.

And the information you obtained from the other

individuals, was that before or after?
A.

The information from Marnie Christianson was before.

The

information from Jessica Goalen was after.
Q.

After you were told by -- you've been a detective, a

poLice officer, for how long?
A.
8 I Q.
9

Seven years.
After somebody told you that they had stolen a safe,

described it, and then you went and verified that

somebody

10

told you about the safe, that they had it stolen from them,

11

did you feel the need to go out and investigate further about

12

whether

13

A.

14

as far as with this particular case.

15

Q.

Was there any question in your mind?

16

A.

No question in my mind.

or not the safe existed?

The time period, five months, I didn't feel it necessary

17

MR. WILLIAMS:

18

THE COURT:

19

Objection.

Conclusory.

Whether there's a question in his mind,

what's the relevance of that, Mr. Wyatt?

20

MR. WYATT:

It keeps being asked did you verify

21 I whether the safe existed.
THE COURT:

The answer is yes or no.

I'm going to

231 sustain the objection.
24

Q.

(BY MR. WYATT)

You took some pictures of the home last

25

week, is that correct?

Voli
A.

Yes.

2 I Q.

That was in anticipation of what?

3

Of this trial.

A.

4

MR. WYATT:

All right.

5J

MR. WILLIAMS:

I don't have

Nothing further, Your Honor.

Thank

you.
THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. WYATT:

I'm not sure if my next witness is here.

If I could have a moment?
10j

THE COURT:

We'll take a brief recess in

11

anticipation of the next witness.

12

have to give you again the admonitions from the past.

13

remind you not to discuss the case or anything about it

14

amongst yourselves or with anyone else.

15

to discuss it in your presence.

16

(Short recess.)

17

(In chambers.)

18

THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen, I
I'll

Do not allow anyone

We'll be in recess.

For introduction purposes, we had a

19

discussion at the bench relative to the line of questioning

20

to be pursued by Mr. Wyatt.

2l

ahead.

22

MR. WILLIAMS:

Mr. Williams had a concern.

Go

Just that we put on the record that

23

at the point -- put in the present record that reflects

24

counsel approaching the bench and the discussion there was

25

whether or not it would be appropriate for Mr. Wyatt to

Volume 2 - Paqe 2/
elicit hearsay statements that were made by other
on the argument that the door had been opened.

individuals

Such a tactic

was based on questioning that was done by me of Detective
Bennett on the subject of whether he had verified the
existence of the safe.
An objection was entered by counsel fcr the defendant: to
proceeding in such a fashion on the argument that the
entirety of the questioning that was done by Mr. Williams of
Mr. Bennett was in the context of talking or not talking with
other family members, et cetera.

That there wasn't a

reasonable inference that the question led -- could be
related to the hearsay statements that were made by others.
The state obviously disagreed with that, and so

did the

court, ruling that the door had been opened sufficiently by
my line of questioning to then proceed -- for Mr. Wyatt to
proceed to ask Detective Bennett about what in fact the other
three hearsay witnesses had declared, and I suppose the
timing of those statements.
I hope the record is otherwise clear and preserves, in
terms of our objections that were made, as to each of those
other three hearsay declarant statements being entered.
THE COURT:

Mr. Wyatt, any further comment on the

report as to what occurred at the bench?
MR. WYATT:

The state's position was that the

defense asked the question of Detective Bennett

if he
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verified with any other person the existence o£ the safe and
2| that that gave us the right to ask that question.
3|

THE COURT:

I think both of you have fairly

4 | reiterated the discussion at the bench.

The line of

5

questioning was whether or not there was any intrinsic

6

evidence of the existence of the safe at all among anybody,

7

not just family members.

8

to allow the state to proceed with proof as to the existence

9

of the same other than the victim 1 s statement.

So the door was sufficiently opened

10

the basis for the ruling.

11

it.

MS. CORPORON:

13

THE COURT:

I think that recaptures it.

Okay.

MS. CORPORON:

Not of a legal nature that I can

think of.

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. CORPORON:

Okay.
Just waiting for people to get

19

through the canyon, I guess.

20

THE COURT:

21

Anything else we need to worry

about today before proceeding?

15
16

I think that pretty well covers

Ms. Corporon?

12

14

So that was

The canyon is bare today.

(Open court.)

22

THE COURT:

Do you want the witness brought in now?

23

MR. WYATT:

I do.

24
25

I'd like him in here so the jury

doesn't see him come in in shackles.
THE COURT:

All right.

ADDENDUM
—D—

26

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)328-1162
Facsimile: (801) 328-9565
SCOTT WILLIAMS #6687
Attorney for Defendant
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 220-0700
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 031101017

TAMARA RI UN EHART,

Judge Gordon J. Low

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the court for hearing on April
28, 2005 before the Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding, the government appearing by and
through its counsel of record, the Defendant appearing individually and by and through her
counsel of record, and the court having considered the motion for new trial of the Defendant,
based thereon and for good cause appearing;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

.o'
The Defendant's motion for new trial is denied.

x

0

DATED THIS / #

day of May, 2005.
BY THE COURT

First District Court Jiictee ^M-^

V

NEK,s; r .r./\s-r»-•«•: « / •

?

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused the foregoing to be e-mailed and mailed to:
GEORGE DA1NES
Cache County Prosecutor
11 West 100 North, 2nd Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
george@,legal.state.ut.us

^

on the U-

day of

2005.

! ft..

v.Secretary

3

Si

I'tiw

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 031101017 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

By Hand
Dated this

/ [

day of

7'/V.W

NAME
MARY C CORPORON
ATTORNEY DEF
808 E S TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
SCOTT C WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY DEF
43 E 400 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
SCOTT L WYATT
, 20

03.

0

O

Deputy Court Clerk
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